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Abstract
This essay is a reinterpretation of the debate over the origins of the factory
system. In the end, it argues, the explanation for the rise of the factory system
lies in the realm of organization, but not in the qualities of organization envisaged
by either the quot;radicalquot; view or the transaction-cost view. Drawing on the
recent explanations of Clark and Lazonick, the paper suggests that the explanation lies in the volume effect rather than the division-of-labor effect of increasing
extent of the market. The essay closes with some musings on the logic of both
efficiency and exploitation in historical explanation.

Introduction.
Within the last two decades, the question of the origin and nature of the factory
system has leapt from obscurity to fill thousands of pages. The seminal article was,
of course, Marglin’s “radical” interpretation of factory organization, a paper now 20
twenty years old. But Marglin’s broadside arguably aroused as much interest as it
did because the questions it addressed were quite congenial to those in which the
larger profession was becoming increasingly interested, namely, questions of
institutions and organization. As exemplified in the work of Douglass North in
economic history and Oliver Williamson in the economics of organization, this New
Institutional Economics, as it was coming to be called, offered a fresh viewpoint on
the nature of capitalist organization during the Industrial Revolution. Economic
historians like David Landes and S. R. H. Jones also took up the cudgels, adding
historical insight and a perspective typically rather different from either the
“radicals” or the New Institutionalists.
Despite the complexity and subtlety of the conversation, it might nonetheless
be helpful to summarize the arguments in a simple schema.

First of all, the

questions, it seems to me, move along two different dimensions.

The first

dimension is what we may call that of origins: whatcaused the factory system to
emerge? The second dimension is what we make call that ofraisons d’être: what is
the nature or essence of the factory system, and how do wecharacterize its cause?
Figure 1 summarizes the possibilities.
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Figure 1
Along the horizontal dimension lies the issue of origins: did the factory system
emerge because of its organizational form, or did it spring from new technology,
notably centralized motive power? Along the vertical dimension is the issue of
raison d’être: did the factory system emerge because it was more efficient than what
went before, or did it emerge because capitalists found themselves able to use
factory organization as a mechanism for worker exploitation?
The traditional Marxian view is that the essence of capitalism is, well, capital.
What characterizes the capitalist system is the mode of production — the technology
— and it is technology that enables the capitalist to create and appropriate surplus
value.1

What was remarkable about Marglin’s assault on capitalist work

organization was his rejection of the Marxian insistence on machinery as the engine
of exploitation. For Marglin, it was the organization of work, not the technology,
that mattered. By subdividing tasks in the manner Smith advocated in theWealth of
Nations, capitalists could deskill work, rendering each task so simple that an

1

For an excellent account of the Marxian system, see Roberts
and Stephenson (1973).
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undifferentiated and untrained proletariat could replace skilled artisans. But the
capitalists divided labor not because this process is more efficient than crafts
production but because deskilling allows the capitalist to control workers more
effectively — and therefore to reap a larger fraction of the joint surplus of
production.2
Writers like Williamson (1980) and North (1981) also view the arrival of the
factory system as a matter of organization. But they see that system as emerging
because of greater efficiency, which they understand largely in terms of the
minimization of transaction costs, especially the costs of material lost to
embezzlement, the costs of coordinating a finely subdivided process, and the costs
of monitoring product quality. Economic historians like Jones (1982, 1987, 1993) and
Landes (1986) have criticized both Marglin and the transaction-cost theorists for a
comparative lack of attention to history. And, despite all the arguments ofa priori
theory, history demonstrates, they assert, that it was the superior technology
3 “No,”
associated with centralized power sources that triggered the factory system.

writes Landes (1986, p. 606), “what made the factory successful in Britain was the
muscle: the machines and the engines. We do not have factories until these were
available, because nothing less would have overcome the cost advantage of
dispersed manufacture.”

2

In addition to Marglin (1974), see Marglin (1984, 1991).
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We might in fact call this the “traditional” view among economic historians. See for example
Mantoux (1961).
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This essay argues that, although proponents of the “efficient technology”
argument are certainly closest to the truth, none of these alternatives has it
completely right. In the end, the explanation for the rise of the factory system does
in fact lie in the realm of organization, but not in the qualities of organization
envisaged by either the “radical” view or the transaction-cost view. The factory
system arose because growth in the extent of the market (for textiles principally, but
eventually most other goods as well) opened up entrepreneurial possibilities for
high-volume throughput. This meant not only an extended division of labor but
also investment in new capabilities (including, but not limited to, capital equipment)
that, by making production more routine, permitted lower unit costs. For reasons
that we will see, these new capabilities implied high fixed costs, at least initially, and
it was these fixed costs that called for the “factory” mode of organization.
Was this efficiency or exploitation?

Efficiency, without doubt.

But the

problem of explanation is a subtle one, and this essay closes with some musings on
the logic of both efficiency and exploitation.

What is a factory?
We need to begin by establishing the meanings of terms. First and foremost: what is
a factory and what is the factory system? There are a number of characteristics,
operating both singly and in conjunction, that one might offer as distinctive of the
factory. Principal among these are
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•

expensive or indivisible technology;

•

the concentration of workers in a single location; and

•

close monitoring or supervision of work.

As Fang (1978, p. 16) suggests, the archetypal factory had all three. Does any of
these by itself define a factory?
The idea that large-scale central-power technology defines the factory is an
idea that goes back at least to Ure (1861, p. 13). From the point of view of this essay,
however, defining the factory by the use of large-scale, expensive, or indivisible
technology rather begs the question. Moreover, there are at least some examples —
notably the famous cottage factories in the silk industry (Jones 1987, p. 90) —
suggesting that it is possible, if perhaps just barely possible, that indivisible central
power could coexist with the putting-out system. (There are plenty of examples,
however, in which indivisible central power is fully compatible withinside
contracting, a point to which I will return.) Conversely, as Axel Leijonhufvud (1986,
p. 205) has noted, if centralized power defines the factory system, are we not
compelled to wonder why the factory system remained alive and well in the era of
small electric motors?
The agglomeration of workers in a single facility is also not a definition of the
factory. Here too there are plenty of examples, going back at least to the Arsenal of
Venice (Lane 1973), of clusters of workers that we would not want to classify as
factories, at least not in the sense of the British factory system of the Industrial
Revolution. Indeed, to the extent that the workers act as independent contractors,

5

the resulting inside contracting system (Buttrick 1952) is in many ways closer to the
putting-out system than it is to the factory system. There is, of course, the issue of
whether the contractor or the capitalist owns the tools of production. In the former
case, one might want to say that labor (the contractor) hires capital (buys his or her
own tools), whereas in the other case capital hires labor. Inside contracting when
the capitalist owns the machinery, as in the case of mule spinning in Lancashire in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Lazonick 1990, p. 80-85), obviously
comes closer to a full-fledged factory than does inside contracting when the
contractor supplies the tools.
Indeed, one often hears the Marx-inspired criterion of capital hiring labor
touted as the defining characteristic of the factory system (not to say of capitalism as
such). And we might well want to describe as a factory a Lancashire mule-spinning
establishment in which master spinners use the capitalist’s machines, power, and
materials to produce yarn on a piece-rate basis.

Yet, there is also arguably

something more to the factory system. An equally strong tradition holds that what
is essential about the firm, if not necessarily the factory, is that the contract between
worker and capitalist within a firm is not a simple contract over output. For Coase
(1937) and his followers, there is an essential difference between a spot-contract for
product and an employment contract. In the former, it is relative prices that matter;
in the latter, it is authority — or so many have interpreted it — that matters: “If a
workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a
change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so” (Coase 1937, p. 387). It

6

is for this reason that Williamson (1975, pp. 71-72), following Simon (1957),
4
characterizes the employment contract as an “authority relation” — a loaded term

— and the capitalist firm as a “hierarchy.”

In much of the literature on the

emergence of the factory system, indeed, “capitalist hierarchy” is assumed to be the
explanandum (e.g., Berg 1991).
There is both truth here and confusion. One wouldn’t want to dispute that
the capitalist firm is a hierarchy, in one or more senses. Surely the boss “tells the
worker what to do,” and this is crucial. But also crucial is the difference between
entrepreneurship and supervision.5

In Simon’s formulation of the “authority

relation,” the capitalist pays a wage for the right to choose which actionx ∈ Ω the
worker will perform at any time, whereΩ is the “job description” or set of allowable
actions to which the worker agrees. As in Coase, the accent here is on the flexible
assignment of workers to tasks. Langlois and Robertson (1995) argue that economic
change, which necessitates the flexible redeployment of economic capabilities in
order to capture entrepreneurial opportunities, is a vital and neglected aspect of the

4

Many other followers of Coase would insist that, in the end, a contract is a contract, and
“authority” is not involved. “To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various
tasks is a deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties. Telling an employee to type this letter
rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather
than that brand of bread.” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, p. 778.) The final station for this train of
thought — areductio, but by no meansad absurdum — is that the firm is nothing but a “nexus of
contracts” (Cheung 1983).

5

As Temin (1991) points out, there is a difference between entrepreneurs, who engage in nonroutine command behavior, and managers, who engage in routine or customary behavior,
including the exertion of factory discipline. “Managers, in short, were the workers’ bosses, but
entrepreneurs were the managers’ bosses” (Temin 1991, p. 350). On the distinction between
command and customary behavior, see Temin (1980).
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theory of vertical integration and disintegration. And, as Peter Temin (1991) has
emphasized, the neglect of this function of entrepreneurial coordination accounts in
large measure for the inability of the “radical” critics of capitalism to detect a nonexploitive function for those they indiscriminately call “bosses.”
But this understanding of “capitalist hierarchy” as flexible redeployment is
also far from the experience of workers in the early factories of the industrial
revolution.

The key point — and here we come finally to the essence of the

definition — is that the factory system consists in a change (relative to the puttingout system or the inside-contracting system) in the nature of thesupervision the
capitalist exercises. Rather than monitoring output, as the putter-out or merchant
capitalist does with a contractor, the factory capitalist (or, more likely, his hired
supervisor) monitors the work process itself. That is to say, the crucial difference
between the merchant capitalist and the factory capitalist is that the latter exerts
factory discipline (Pollard 1963, 1965).
Now, one can argue that factory discipline also does not by itself define th
e
factory system. There was plenty of “factory discipline” under the putting-out
system. The discipline — the monitoring of the work process itself — was the
province of the master of the cottage, whose charges were typically members of his
own family as well as some casual laborers.6 A putting-out cottage or artisan

6

This was also true of inside contractors like the master spinners in Lancashire. These masters,
who hired and disciplined their own “scavengers” and “piecers,” were far more likely to use and
abuse child labor than were capitalists directly employing labor, and they accounted for a
significant fraction of the child labor in the industry (Ure 1861, pp. 290 ff; Pollard 1965, p. 43).
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workshop was thus a factory by this definition. So the transition to the factory
system represented not a shift away from supervision of the work processper se but
a shift in the locus of that supervision from the subcontracting cottage master to the
factory owner (Cohen 1981). Figure 2 summarizes the possibilities.

Work force
concentrated

Work force
dispersed

Process
supervision

Factory system

—

Product
monitoring

Inside contracting

Putting out

Figure 2
Division of labor, routine, and technology.
We can think of the putting-out system and the factory system as alternative
institutional trajectories,7 and the problem of explaining the rise of the factory
system as a problem of explaining Britain’s transition from one trajectory to the
other.
As an institutional structure, the putting-out system offered a number of
advantages. Principal among these was low labor cost. Apart, in the early years,
from evading urban guild regulations, the merchant capitalist or putter out could

7

In the sense of Langlois and Robertson (1995, chapter 6). I return to this idea below.
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take advantage in the countryside of surplus labor time made available by the
seasonal nature of agriculture. The rural location of work also meant that cottagers
could keep to some agricultural pursuits, thus lowering their subsistence needs from
outside sources and further reducing labor costs relative to urban areas. Moreover,
as the cottager owned his or her own tools, and capital requirements were low in
any case, putting-out was a strategy that offered the advantage of flexibility: in
times of low demand, the capitalist had little in the way of fixed costs to cover.
The transaction-cost theorists, however, point to some of the short-comings of
this system. The very dispersion of work made monitoring difficult, encouraging, in
particular, embezzlement of materials, which the domestic worker could then either
resell or work up on his or her own account. The embezzlement was typically
covered up by reducing the quality rather than the quantity (which could be more
easily measured) of the finished product. As we saw, North and Williamson see the
superiority of the factory in light of the easier monitoring of “inside” production.
But Jones (1982, 1993), among others, has disputed the importance of embezzlement,
noting that the merchants compensated for expected embezzlement with lower
prices and certain other tricks like the truck system, which required the workers to
take their compensation in kind. Moreover, it is not clear that the benefits of
avoiding embezzlement and shoddy work outweighed the advantages of putting
out.

When it was worth it — when the material, such as Spanish wool, was

especially valuable, or when problems of quality-control were especially serious —
workshops did indeed spring up (Pollard 1965, p. 33).
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That there were few

examples of this in the heyday of the putting-out system suggests that, for the most
part, embezzlement costs didn’t outweigh the benefits of low labor costs and
flexibility. There is a message here. Although transaction-cost theorists understand
in principle that evaluating relative efficiency is a matter of counting up both
transaction costs and production costs (Williamson 1985, p. 103), in practice analysts
often forget the production-cost part — and production costs frequently turn out to
be decisive (Langlois and Robertson 1995, chapter 3).
There is a more important point. This process of evaluating the relative
efficiency of institutions — comparative-institutional analysis, as it is called in the
Coasean tradition — is almost always conceived of as a static exercise. Seldom do
the evaluators consider the rates of change of the relevant variables along with their
magnitudes. (Put less neoclassically: they don't seriously consider history.) What is
significant about the transaction costs of the putting out system is not so much the
costs of embezzlement but the rate of change in those costs. Before the second half
of the eighteenth century, embezzlement and deteriorating quality were not serious
problems. What made them problems — or, more correctly, symptoms of a far
larger problem — was the increasing demand for the products of the outworkers,
especially spun yarn,8 as final demand for fabric accelerated. Landes (1969, pp. 57ff.)
argues, indeed, that by the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century, the putting-out
system was reaching its limits. Although flexible in downturns, the system was

8

In the era before major mechanical innovations in cotton machinery, spinning was the bottleneck,
as it took the output of upwards of five spinners to supply one hand loom (Landes 1969, p. 57).
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difficult to crank up in the face of predictable, secularly increasing demand. The
possibilities for geographical expansion had been exhausted, and pressure at the
intrinsic margin — output per worker — was met, Landes tells us, with a backwardbending supply-of-effort curve. Indeed, embezzlement was largely a reaction by the
outworkers to the capitalists’ attempt to lower real piece rates through indirect
means as diminishing returns set in (Landes 1969, p. 59).
Others would dispute the extent to which the putting-out system had
reached exhaustion in this period.9 Labor supply was growing, transportation costs
were falling, and in many sectors the extent of putting-out was growing both before
10 And
and after the Napoleonic Wars. In the end, “exhaustion” is a relative matter.

it is more than arguable that the growing extent of the market for manufactured
goods had begun by the late eighteenth century to make profitable an alternative
technological trajectory opened up by the invention of water- and steam-powered
machinery. This was nowhere more significant than in cotton fabrics, the industry
that became the avatar both of British manufacturing and of the factory system itself
(Fang 1978). But the mechanism by which increases in demand led to or triggered
the move to the factory system remain obscure — or at any rate subtle.
With the geographic margin of the putting-out system arguably reaching (if
not having already reached) the point of diminishing returns, there remained two

9

Notably S. R. H. Jones in private communication
with the author.
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And continued growth in the extent of putting out is not by itself inconsistent with the onset of
diminishing returns.

12

other margins on which to push: the workers’ level of effort and the organization of
production. (What about technology? I’ll come back to that.) And here Marglin
enters the picture. One aspect of his argument is to draw our attention to the
usefulness of factory organization in pushing along the effort margin. Factory
discipline can get more effort out of a given labor force, and in that way break the
bottleneck of the putting-out system to the owners’ (but not, of course, the workers’)
advantage. We will look at this argument more closely in the next section. Notice
here, however, that Marglin neglects the organizational margin. That is, he does not
see the reorganization of production in the factory (of which factory discipline may
play a part) as another way of attacking the cost bottleneck of the putting-out
system. Organization, for Marglin, is merely a stratagem that allows the capitalists
to exert pressure on worker effort, and it conveys no efficiency benefits in its own
right. Needless to say, there is reason to think that capitalists pushed on all margins
simultaneously, and that the organization margin yielded considerably.
In what way did organization change? By Adam Smith’s famous theorem (or
its converse, at any rate), the increasing demand for textiles in the late eighteenth
century should have called for increasing division of labor. And this, in turn, should
have led to a more intricate sequencing of tasks. In the pinshop model, the timesequencing of tasks becomes crucial, as one worker’s output is the input to the next
worker. By monitoring the work process, the capitalist can make the workers work
at the system’s pace rather than at their own, assuring that intermediate product
flows smoothly between stages. Thus does Williamson (1980) argue the superiority

13

of the factory system in part on the grounds that it economizes on work-in-process
inventories relative to an (inside or outside) contracting system.

This is not

implausible. Buttrick (1952), for example, lays the demise of inside contracting in
the American small-arms industry of the nineteenth century largely to inefficient
inventory systems.11 On the other hand, Clark (1994) has calculated that the cost of
work-in-process inventories would in fact have been unimportant in the factories of
the industrial revolution.
Leijonhufvud (1986) suggests another reason why the division of labor may
have led to the factory system. In the pinshop model, all the workers become
complementary to one another, in contrast to crafts artisans, who are substitutes in
production. This complementarity means that, if the workers owned their own
tools, they could individually threaten to withdraw their capital from the
production process in order to capture a larger share of the joint rents of
production.12 This is the phenomenon of “hold up” familiar in the transaction-cost
literature (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). If, however, the physical capital
were pooled under common ownership — and capital hired labor instead of the
other way around — this problem would disappear (or be replaced, at any rate, with
the problem of bargaining with a labor union). This does not explain, however, the

11

On the other hand, the just-in-time inventory system, invented in the early American automobile
industry as “hand-to-mouth buying” (Flugge 1929, p. 163), suggests that contractors can also in
principle regulate product flow carefully. Indeed, hand-to-mouth buying is itself an instance of
the division of labor, for it decouples the function of speculation in inventories from the
manufacturing function (Stillman 1927, p. 3).

12

This also depends, however, on the worker’s capital being firm specific as well as process
specific. If there is a thick market for, say, weavers, a weaver who threatens to withdraw his
looms from a firm might be easily replaced with less-recalcitrant alternates.
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existence of process monitoring in Fang’s archetypal factory, since, as we saw, the
fact of capital hiring labor does not speak to the nature of thecontract between
capital and labor, and is perfectly consistent with inside contracting.
Does this mean that organizational advantages do not explain the factory
system? If we take organizational advantages to mean the transaction-cost problems
of the division of labor, as those terms are usually understood, the answer is
probably that they do not.

If, however, we broaden our field to mean by

organizational advantages an imperative of which the division of labor is itself only
derivative, then organization does indeed matter. To see what this means, let’s
consider the process of production more carefully.
Under crafts production, labor is undivided in the sense that each artisan
performs a wide range of tasks. This requires a relatively large investment in
human capital, since, to be proficient, the artisan must be accomplished in a wide
variety of skills or subskills.

Crafts production also implies a certain kind of

flexibility and a lack of standardization, since the artisan controls the “interfaces”
between tasks and the connections between parts. If, with Nelson and Winter
(1982), we think of production as a matter of exercising and choosing among certain
“routines,”13 then crafts production requires the possession of and ability to choose
among a wide range of possible routines (Stinchcombe 1990, chapter 2). Crafts
production thus obviously has advantages when production runs are small, for

13

See also Ames and Rosenberg (1965), who talk about the activities performed in production as
instances of rule-following behavior.
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reasons of both demand and supply. On the demand side, as Smith reminds us, the
division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, and, if “the number of
potential buyers of a commodity were too small, it would not be possible to dispose
of the increased output which differentiation permits, forcing a worker to perform
several activities in order to earn enough to fend off starvation” (Robertson and
Alston 1992, p. 331). On the supply side, crafts production may be necessary or
advantageous when the production process involves uncertainty, in the sense that
the choice of routines must be fitted interactively to changing particular
circumstances (Stinchcombe 1990, pp. 66-70).
We can think of a spectrum of skill levels.14 At one end of the spectrum are
deskilled — or, at any rate, unskilled —factory workers. These operatives have a
small repertoire of routines, and they engage in a restricted range of active choice
within that repertoire. In other words, unskilled workers perform routine activities
(in the less-technical sense of the term). At the other extreme are professionals —
physicians, architects, attorneys, academics — who must have large repertoires of
routines and who must be able to choose deftly among routines to fit changing
particular circumstances. In addition, professionals also engage in innovation, the
introduction of new routines (Savage 1994).

In between are the semiskilled

occupations, like tradesmen — carpenters, plumbers, drywallers, electricians — or
the crafts artisans of the eighteenth century. These workers must also choose among

14

Following Ames and Rosenberg (1965), I am here tak
ing “skill level” to be a measure of the size
of the workers repertoire of routines. In fact, we can also think of being skillful as meaning skill
deepening, that is, a highly developed ability to perform one or a few routines.
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routines flexibly, but both the size of the repertoire and the range of application of
the routines is more restricted. Semiskilled workers also are less likely to innovate
routines.
Obviously, artisans in crafts production are more difficult to monitor directly
than are factory operatives. Indeed, as Minkler (1993) argues, workers — especially
skilled ones — may possess knowledge that is qualitatively different from that of
supervisors, making monitoring costly even in the absence of principal-agent
problems of the standard neoclassical sort.15 It is not surprising, therefore, that, as
skill level increases, workers are less likely to be employees (supervised in process)
and are more likely to interact with the market through subcontracting relations
(monitored in product by relative prices).16
I have argued that the key trigger — I will postpone using the word “cause”
— of the transition to the factory system was the secular increase in demand for the
products of manufacturing. What is significant here, however, is not only theextent
of the market but also the predictability of the market. When the extent of the
market for a product increases, especially if it does so without much fluctuation, the
production process becomes less uncertain, in the sense that the selection of

15

Minkler (1992) uses this idea of specialized knowledge as an explanation for the franchising
contract, a modern-day analogue of the putting-out system.
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Professionals, indeed, are autonomous not only in the sense that they are seldom employees but
also in that “no one except another professional is able to challenge the day-to-day decisions of a
professional” (Savage 1994, p. 139). And professionals are monitored not only by relative prices
but by a complex set of institutions, including peer monitoring.

17

17
productive routines requires less interactive tailoring to particular circumstances.

This reduction in uncertainty leads to two distinct effects, only one of which is
captured in the traditional notion of the division of labor. I will call these the
division-of-labor effect and the volume effect.
The former is much discussed if not always well understood. As we ave
h
seen, it is only when flexible interactive selection among routines is no longer
necessary that labor can be divided in the manner Smith advocated. Each worker
can concentrate narrowly and deeply on a smaller subset of the routines necessary
for production precisely because the function of selection among the routines
becomes effectively hard-wired into the system.

Variability in the pace of the

individual workers can introduce a mild kind of uncertainty, but one, as we have
also seen, that can be “buffered” (in Stinchcombe’s terms) by work-in-process — or
buffer — inventories, the cost of which may or may not be significant to the choice of
monitoring system.
In the Smithian story, labor starts out skilled (crafts production) but tools are
specialized; with the division of labor, labor specializes (tools remaining specialized)
and, through differentiation spurred by innovation, perhaps increases its level of
specialization. This does not exhaust the possibilities, however. It is also possible,
through mechanical innovation, for tools to integrate previously separate tasks
(Robertson and Alston 1992) and, in general, for machines to become more “skilled,”
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In more technical terms, predictability reduces the behavioral entropy of the choice among
routines. For an analysis of the effect of uncertainty and unpredictability on the selection of
actions from a repertoire, see Langlois (1986a).
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that is, to have a larger repertoire of routines (Ames and Rosenberg 1965). For
example, to the extent that the advent of the self-acting mule after the 1830s
“deskilled” the spinner (that is, required less skill in our sense than the common
mule), it did so not because it subdivided labor more finely but because the machine
itself became more skilled.18
Notice that, like the subdivision of tasks, the introduction of more-skilled
machinery requires both increased volume of output and predictability of output.
Consider the simple jig. With a reduction in uncertainty — permitting an increase in
standardization — the sequencing of choice among routines can be hard-wired into
a machine.19
In drilling the plate A without the jig the skilled mechanic must
expend thought as well as skill in properly locating the holes. The
unskilled operator need expend no thought regarding the location of
the holes. That part of the mental labor has been done once for all by
the tool maker. It appears, therefore, that a“transfer of thought” or
intelligence can also be made from a person to a machine. If the
quantity of parts to be made is sufficiently large to justify the
expenditure, it is possible to make machines to which all the required
skill and thought have been transferred and the machine does not
require even an attendant, except to make adjustments. Such
machines are known as full automatic machines. (Kimball 1929, p. 26,
emphasis original.)

18

The acquisition of skill by a machin
e does not, however, imply deskilling of labor. Consider the
backhoe, which integrates a number of ditch-digging functions. It requires an operator more
skilled than any manual ditch-digger (Robertson and Alston 1992).

19

Machines, of course, can deal with some kinds of uncertainty. The prime example is the Jacquard
loom, the ancestor of modern numerical-control techniques. But even in modern computer-aided
manufacturing, the degree and type of uncertainty with which machines can deal is limited to
what I call parametric uncertainty (Langlois 1984).
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This transfer of skill to machines is another manifestation of the process that
motivates the division of labor, namely, the increasing routine and standardization
of production. It is also an aspect of what I have called the volume effect. It is not,
however, the only aspect. As the quote above suggests, the transfer to a machine of
“intelligence” — that is, the ability to select among operational routines — often
takes the form of a jig, pattern, or die. And, as Alchian (1959) points out, the
“method of production is a function of the volume of output, especially when
output is produced from basic dies— and there are few, if any, methods of production
that do not involve ‘dies’” (Alchian 1959 [1977, p 282], emphasis added). Why?
Because, with increased volume, it pays to invest inmore durable dies.
Consider the example of printing. If one is going to run off a few copies of a
memo, a photocopy machine will do the trick. If one needs several hundred copies
of documents on an ongoing basis, it might be worth investing in a small offset
press. For even larger predictable production runs, it would pay to have a more
serious printing press. As volume and predictability allow greater “durability of
dies,” unit costs decline. This is an effect of growth in the extent of the market
distinct from the division of labor narrowly understood.
In the case of cotton textiles during the Industrial Revolution, it is argu
able
that the volume effect was more important than increases in the division of labor.
For one thing, as Pollard (1965, p. 34) and others have noted, the division of labor
was one of the benefits that originally recommended the putting out system. And,
although there was surely room for further division of labor in factories, most of the
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change in technology and organization in cotton was in fact arguably of a sort that
increased the skill of machines rather than more finely subdividing tasks. Moreover,
the history of technological change in cotton textiles is one directed very much
toward what we could call greater durability of “dies.”

The spinning jenny,

waterframe, and later the mule were ways of multiplying for many bobbins
simultaneously the routines of the spinning wheel.

Innovations in weaving,

printing,20 and other departments could be described in a similar way.

“Durability,” fixed costs, and supervision.
Obviously, if increasing extent of the market led to what I have called the volume
effect — more highly skilled machines embodying more durable “dies” — then
there is likely some connection between the extent of the market and the factory
system. The precise nature of that connection, however, requires some elucidation.
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Indeed, the case of calico printing is an example almost literally analogous to the printing
example cited above: cylinder printing was invented in 1783 not for text but for the printing of
calicoes, moving Baines (1966, p. 265, cited in Mokyr 1990, p. 99) to compare the advancement of
this machine over block printing to the advancement of mechanical spinning over the spinning
wheel.
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t1
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Throughput
Figure 3: throughput and fixed costs.
The first missing link in the argument is the relationship between the volume
effect and fixed costs. It is far from implausible to postulate that
, ceteris paribus, as
the skill and durability-as-die of machines increases, so do fixed costs. For graphic
simplicity, Figure 3 displays the relationship between throughput (which I will use
as a shorthand for the volume effect) and fixed costs as linear, but the second
derivative of the relationship will likely depend in fact on the particular technology
and industry under consideration. The upward-sloping relationship holds at any
particular planning date t. Over, time, however, the curve is likely to shift down.
That is, with innovation and learning in the production process and the machinery
industries that supply it, the costs of providing any particular level of durability will
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decline. Only in an atemporal sense, then, does increased throughput imply higher
fixed costs.21
Recall that factory organization means not only workers concentrated in a
single location but also the direct supervision of work. By elaborating on a couple of
recent models of worker effort and organization (Lazonick 1990, Clark 1994), we can
generate several different arguments for why increased fixed costs might lead to
factory organization.
Consider Figure 4. MP0 is the marginal productivity of labor (equal to the
wage in competitive equilibrium) as a function of effort, assumed linear for
convenience, for the representative firm with fixed costsF0.22 If the labor market is
indeed competitive, and each worker’s marginal product is separately observable,
then the firm will offer a piece-rate contract that rewards workers according to
marginal product (and is thus identical to MP0); and the representative worker with
utility function U(e,w) will supply effort e0 and receive payment w0. In this world,
there is no need for direct monitoring of the work process, and fixed costs don’t
change that. A firm with fixed costsF1 (and, plausibly, a steeper marginal-productof-labor curve) can keep the worker on the same indifference curve by offering wage
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Whether the observed expansion path is upward or downward sloping (that
is, whether we
observe increased throughput and higher fixed costs in a particular industry) will depend on the
relative strengths of the volume effect and the rate of innovation in machinery.
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That is, the firm will be willing (and able) to pay the worker a wage
w = ve - F, where v is the
value of a unit of effort to the firm,e is effort, andF is the rental cost of fixed capital (Clark 1994,
p. 138). Thus the value of zero effort is -F, since the the worker tie up machinery and other fixed
inputs; and workers become more valuable as they provide more effort.
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w1, which elicits effort e1. The worker works harder and receives a higher wage, but
there is no need for discipline.

MP1
U(e,w) = constant

wage

MP0
B

w1

A

w0

e0

e1

effort

-F0

-F1

Figure 4.
(After Clark (1994).)
Obviously, this could change if marginal product were costly to determine.
In that case, a piece-rate contract might be infeasible, and the capitalist would have
to contract for an hourly wage. The worker would agree to supply (to firm 0) effort
level e0 in exchange for wage w0. But, to the extent that monitoring of output is
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costly, the worker could reach a higher indifference curve by shirking and supplying
less than e0. Direct monitoring of work in such a case may be less costly than the
productivity foregone.

Indeed, for firm 1, the marginal cost of shirking (the

marginal productivity foregone) is greater because of the steeper slope of MP
1. This
qualifies as an explanation for the transition to the factory system, since it explains
why process supervision (which requires centralized location) would eventually
become economical as the extent of the market (and with it throughput and fixed
costs) grew.23 It is a transaction-cost explanation, but one rather different from those
offered by Williamson, North, or Leijonhufvud. It comes closest, in fact, to the story
told by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), in which the inability separately to meter
individual marginal products leads to process monitoring by a specialist monitor,
who, as residual claimant, is in turn monitored by market prices.
The problem with the shirking explanation is that it relies on a specific kind
of monitoring difficulty, namely indivisibilities in team production. In the textile
industry,

however,

individual

marginal

products

were

arguably

quite

distinguishable, and, indeed, the success of the putting-out system in this and other
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Writing in the context of contractual choice in agriculture in the post-bellum American South,
Alston and Higgs (1982, pp. 340-341) suggest a complementary reason why increased capital
intensity might lead to closer supervision. If, perhaps because of the absolute amount of capital
required, capital hires labor, then it is in the interest of the capitalist to monitor closely to ensure
that the worker properly maintains the productive assets. As with the shirking explanation, this
motive becomes more urgent the more capital intensive the production process. Monitoring to
avoid harm to capital assets is not, however, necessarily the kind of supervision that keeps up
worker effort. Moreover, Lazonick (1990, pp. 350-351) maintains that supervision to keep up
effort levels actuallyincreases harm to capital assets by encouraging sabotage to slow the pace.
Nonetheless, it may well be that what appeared to be supervision to maintain effort level alone
actually had other motives instead or in addition, a point to which I return below.
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important industries suggests that there was no general monitoring-cost problem in
offering piece rates.24
An exploitation explanation is in many ways the flip-side of the shirking
story. Instead of the worker reducing effort below what was contracted for, in the
simplest version of an exploitation story, the capitalist squeezes more effort out of
the worker than was contracted for. This is essentially Marx’s idea: the capitalist
pays the going (subsistence) wage for abstract labor power, but then must apply
discipline to get the concrete labor out of the worker, the labor value of which
concrete labor is more than the wage.

24

On the other hand, it is possible that tasks that were susceptible to piece-rate contracting under
the putting out system might not be so susceptible when the workforce is concentrated. A
number of writers have argued that the very concentration of the workforce lowers the
transaction costs of (typically informal) collective action to manipulate the piece-rate system to
the workers’ advantage (Csontos 1993; Lazonick 1990). When this is possible, direct process
supervision may become less costly.
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Figure 5: an exploitation explanation.

Clark (1994) offers a slightly different interpretation of what he calls a
“coercion” account of factory discipline.25 See figure 5. Firm 0 (perhaps the puttingout system) is in initial equilibrium at point A. By increasing fixed costs, the
capitalist shifts the marginal productivity of labor to MP
1. It now pays to increase
worker effort, which the capitalist does by introducing discipline. But the workers
must be compensated by a higher wagew1, and the difference betweenw1 and w0 is
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As we will see, Clark’s story is not in fact obviously a “coercion” account, since his argument is
ultimately that the contract w( 1, e1) plus discipline is both Pareto optimal and ultimately
voluntary.
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a “disgust premium” for submitting to discipline. This is exploitation in one sense,
since the worker is not paid at marginal product and the capitalist pockets the
surplus.

Since point B is not a competitive equilibrium, however, one has to

introduce a mechanism to keep wages from being bid up (and effort bid down) to
marginal product. “Radicals” (e.g., Marglin 1991, p. 243) find it easy to assert that
the worker “has no choice”; neoclassicals find it less easy to do so. (I return to this
issue below.)
Why is factory discipline necessary at point B? Obviously, if the capitalist
announces a wage contract of (w1, e1), the worker will have an incentive to accept but
then to supply effort less than e1. But, as we saw, unless we introduce transaction
costs that prevent cheap monitoring of worker output, there exists a piece-rate
contract that will elicit efforte1 for payment of w1. (It would be given by the slope of
a line tangent to the indifference curve at B.) Clark’s account, however, is more
interesting. Before we turn to it, consider a broader class of explanations (to which
Clark’s belongs) in which the worker’s preferences do not appear as fully formed
and given over the entire relevant space.
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MP0

wage
B

w0
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e1

e0

effort

-F0

-F1
Figure 6: backward-bending effort supply.

In a model that is similar in many ways to that of Clark, Lazonick (1990)
formalizes an explanation of factory discipline hinted at by both “radicals” and
economic historians: a backward-bending supply curve of effort. Put in terms of the
story we have been telling, the representative worker may have a utility function
such that the capitalist will not be able to elicit higher levels of effort with pecuniary
incentives. For example, in Figure 6, there is no wage less than or equal to marginal
product, and therefore no piece-rate contract, that will elicit an effort level, such as
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e1, that makes the higher-throughput technology (MP1) economical. Lazonick does
not think of these preferences as immutable standards of economic welfare,
however, but as “customary effort norms” (1990, p. 348) that should not be allowed
to impede the adoption of higher-throughput technology. He agrees with Marglin,
he says, that “the success of the factory system depended not on technology but on
the creation of a social environment conducive to the imposition of work
discipline”26 (1990, p. 52). That is to say, the capitalists had to teach the workers a
different set of effort norms. Factory discipline served this function.

26

As I have hinted, however, Lazonick’s high-fixed-cost model does in fact suggest that technology
was indeed in part responsible for the factory system, in that it was fixed costs that made
discipline desirable. In Lazonick’s defense, however, fixed costs do not always mean physical
capital; they can also mean human-capital investments and fixed investments in organizational
capabilities. How important these latter were compared with physical capital during the
Industrial Revolution is an open question. Despite his inclination to heap praise on Marglin
e.g.,(
Lazonick 1991, pp. 291-294), Lazonick’s account is on the whole quite at variance with that of
Marglin. For Lazonick, changes in favor of high-throughput production (during the Industrial
Revolution and at other times) do in fact reflect efficiency, and are moreover the principal engine
of economic growth and competitive advantage. In addition, the imposition of these
technologies is not typically exploitation, in that the most successful episodes of rapid economic
growth have occurred when institutions permitted capitalists and workers to share the gains of
new technology so that neither would have an incentive to impede those changes. Indeed, in
Lazonick’s work the failure of economic growth and competitiveness often takes the form of
laborers standing in the way of the efforts of capitalists to impose more-efficient high-throughput
methods.
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Figure 7: Discontinuous indifference curve.

Clark places a somewhat different twist on this account. He notes that,
although workers complained about the pace of work, and although they would
have chosen both lower e and lower w if allowed to pick their own effort/wage
tradeoff, workers nonetheless voluntarily chose the high wages and hard work of
the factories.

This suggests a problem of marginal incentives: effectively, the

worker’s indifference curves are either discontinuous (they exist only locally around
specific points, as suggested in Figure 7) or exhibit local nonconvexities. In either
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case, workers cannot traverse the space from point A to point B along the same
indifference curve when technology changes; given a choice on the margin, they will
take leisure over higher wages. Yet, if they are “coerced” into working at point B,
they will accept the non-marginal tradeoff between B and the lower-wage, lowereffort alternatives. “The workers dislike discipline, but they stay in the factory
because at the end of the week their wage is 60 percent greater than that they can
achieve without discipline” (Clark 1994, p. 160). Thus the workers are not “coerced”
into doing what the capitalist wants them to do — that is, they are not exploited;
rather, the workers are “coerced” into doing what they themselves would like to do
but can’t bring themselves to do on the margin.
Like Lazonick (and many others), Clark sees factory discipline — like
discipline in other areas of life — as aimed at a problem of individual preference.
But, like Alchian and Demsetz, he sees discipline as correcting a problem of
externality rather than as changing preferences. As with the shirking workers in the
Alchian-and-Demsetz story, monitoring here solves a problem of divergence
between marginal incentives and the global optimum. In this case, however, it is a
“shirking” externality that occurs within each worker’s individual psyche. Like a
dieter faced with a piece of cake, the worker sees a bit of leisure on the margin as far
more enticing than higher wages, even though, like a more-svelte figure to the
dieter, the longer-range goal of income is ultimately more desirable — by the
individual’s own lights. Just as teams of bargemen in pre-Revolutionary China
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hired an overseer to whip them,27 workers in the industrial revolution acceded
willingly, though not happily, to the “coercion” of their capitalist masters.
In a sense, Clark has bridged the gap between arguments from preference
change and arguments from monitoring costs, which is to say that he has
“neoclassicized” the contention that the factory system required a new kind of
industrial worker. Since Jevons, neoclassical economics has seen the labor process as
a matter of preferences, which are assumed given. Clark’s innovation is to suggest
that one can ultimately explain even what may appear to be “coercion” in terms of
the traditional given-preference approach. In the end, indeed, Lazonick’s account is
not far different. He too sees “customary effort norms” as reflecting the preferences
of workers, and couches the difficulties of moving to a Pareto-improving contract of
higher wages for higher effort not in terms of preference change but in terms of the
worker’s distrust of the capitalist.
I am enough of a neoclassical to agree that preferences do in the end matter.
28
But I also think that it is often quite difficult to disentangle preferences from skills.

If we take the perspective on the work process suggested earlier, then work, even
unskilled work, is not only a matter of supplying some homogeneous commodity
called effort but also a matter of possessing and choosing among a repertoire of
routines. Lazonick writes about the problems of encouraging workers to acquire
skills, arguing that close supervision can be antithetical to a skilled work force to the
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Or so Steven Cheung (1983) claims.
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For an elaboration of this point, see Langlois and Cosgel (1997).
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extent that it fosters industrial conflict, which in turn encourages capitalists to
deskill workers in an effort to control them. It may, however, be possible for the
reverse to be true. Close supervision may sometimes be a not a technique for
maintaining effort per se but a way of conveying skills to the workers. What skills?
The skills necessary to work effectively with technology and production processes to
29
which in the beginning the workers would have been unused.

Changing

“customary effort norms” may have been as much a matter of changing skills as of
changing preferences. This is particularly relevant if we are trying to explain a
transition from the putting-out system (especially in textiles), where levels of effort
30 The factories required new
among outworkers often rivaled those in the factories.

habits of work, and by no means all of these were the habit of working harder.
Perhaps it was the need for new skills — skills complementary to a new
technological trajectory — and not just the need for more effort that made factory
discipline what Pollard (1965) describes as the central management problem of the
industrial revolution.
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In the South after the Civil War, it was common for agricultural workers to begin their careers as
closely supervised wage laborers and then eventually to become share-cropping contractors, a
phenomenon known as the “agricultural ladder.” Alston and Higgs (1982) argue that this
phenomenon cannot be solely the result of the workers possessing greater physical capital with
age but must also involve increasing human capital, which is the neoclassical shorthand for a
repertoire of relevant skills. This suggests that, once taught the necessary repertoire of behaviors
through supervised wage labor, the workers could be monitored easily enough with pecuniary
incentives.
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As Pollard makes clear in his detailed account of the pro
blems of factory labor, it was not level of
effort per se that distinguished the factory from the cottage. The crucial difference was the
regularity of the work, against which the otherwise hard-working operatives chafed. In addition,
the factory workers required new skills in accuracy and standardization and needed to take
proper care of machinery that was not their own (Pollard 1965, p. 181). There is more to
“discipline” than effort, and much of it is in the nature of skills.
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Evolution, explanation, and the inevitable.
We now arguably have one part of the story. What caused the transition to the
factory system? Increasing extent of the market led not only to greater division of
labor but also to greater predictability in the production process. This volume effect
permitted production processes to use more durable “dies,” which implied higher
throughput and higher fixed costs, ceteris paribus. And these latter increased for
various reasons the marginal benefit of direct process supervision, understood not
merely as a way of keeping up effort but as a way of inculcating and reinforcing a
repertoire of workers’ routines complementary to the production process.
But was this efficiency or exploitation? Marglin (1991) reminds us, quite
rightly, that our answer to that question necessarily depends on the ideological
preconceptions we bring with us.

This does not mean, however, that such

preconceptions are beyond discussion, especially if we narrow the field by distilling
from “ideology” an underlying explanatory apparatus. For Marglin, the alternative
ideologies are mainstream neoclassical economics and “radical” economics. We can
take these as convenient starting points, even if we will want to move beyond them.
Efficiency explanations, of course, are the bailiwick of mainstream economics.
“I think it fair to say,” says Marglin, “that mainstream economists, even if they do
not see capitalism as the best of all logically possible systems, see the status quo, as
did Mr [sic] Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide, as the best of all realistically feasible
systems ... . Markets not only work, but when left free of meddlesome government
intervention, work well; markets areefficient. Indeed, efficiency is the watchword of
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the mainstream economist” (Marglin 1991, p. 229, emphasis original). By contrast,
“radical” economists “see the concentration of power in the hands of an élite of
bankers, businessmen, and bureaucrats as an obstacle to the realization of the
individual and the community. And they see the democratization of the economy
— the extension to the factory and the office of the participatory principles on which
Western political democracy is founded — as an essential part of the project of
human liberation” (Marglin 1991,loc. cit.).
Cast in terms of explanatory frameworks, the distinction looks something
like this. Neoclassical economics is the epitome of Panglossian explanation because
it fuses (in Marglin’s view) the inevitable and the desirable. The factory system, to
Marglin’s mainstream economist, could not but have emerged, as it was the product
of efficient economic forces; and, precisely because it was the product of efficiency, it
was for the best.31 By contrast, Marglin’s “radical” explanatory framework is the
epitome of a non-necessitarian explanation. The factory system did not have to
emerge, and it is not to the good that it did emerge.

This is not to say that

institutional structures emerge in a completely arbitrary way: Marglin is sure power
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In the case of the factory system of the late eighteenth century, it may be possible — with a little
stretching — to associate the status quo (the factory system) with the “unfettered” market. But it
has always seemed to me absurd to claim in general that neoclassical economics is Panglossian
on the grounds that it upholds the efficacy of free markets. Even in the most market-oriented
countries, the “status quo” is scarcely the free market: an absolutely enormous part of the
modern economy is regulated by the state or otherwise under political control. In the modern
world, a belief in the efficacy of markets makes one a “radical,” not a Panglossian, as recent
events in the United States may be serving to demonstrate. To the extent that mainstream
neoclassical economics is Panglossian it is because it does
not uphold the efficacy of markets with
much conviction. “Market failure” is as much the watchword of the normative neoclassical as is
“efficiency,” and this malleable doctrine can be and has been used indiscriminately to assert the
primacy of “Western political democracy” over individual rights.
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matters, though he does not endorse the complete Marxian theory of class struggle;
and, at times, the profit motive even seems to matter. The point, however, is that
things could — and, of course, should — have been other than they were. Society is
not, or at least need not, be under the sway of impersonal forces or laws, but can and
should be reshaped by human will.32
One might think these sketches of the explanatory altern
atives to be
caricatures or straw men. Sadly, they are not. But perhaps this should not be
surprising, since these magnetic poles of explanation have a long intellectual
heritage. F. A. Hayek (1967) has traced them back at least as far as the ancient
Greeks, who thought all social structures to be either natural (completely
independent of human will) or artificial (consciously created by human will). As
David Hume, Adam Smith, and the other philosophers of the Scottish
Enlightenment understood, however, the interplay between necessity and will is far
more complex than this distinction admits. For the Scots and their followers, social
institutions — like the factory system — are the results of human action but not of
human design.33

32

The exact nature of the human will involved is not at all clear, however. Only at its peril, Marglin
argues, will a society “leave any important decisions to the haphazard aggregation of individual
maximizing decisions, be these decisions expressed through a market, a polling booth, or what
have you. Society may leave to individuals to determine whether they eat apples or nuts, but not
what the rate of growth is, what the distribution of income is, or what the structure of relative
prices is” (Marglin 1991, pp. 228-229). As to who or what “society” is Marglin is understandably
silent.

33

In the famous phrase of Adam Ferguson (1980 [1767]). For a more thorough discussion of these
issues of institutional explanation, see Langlois (1986b) and Langlois and Everett (1994).
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On the one hand, this means that institutions, and the process of their
evolution, have a systematic structure susceptible to study. They are the results of
innumerable individual wills; but they are not, as Marglin (1991, p. 228) would have
it, a “haphazard aggregation” of human intention. The structures that emerge from
the process of human action are not entirely arbitrary. On the other hand, however,
those structures are not ineluctable. Even less are they “optimal,” except in a
restricted sense.
Institutional structures are the result, then, of an evolutionary dynamic. It
would hardly seem worth pointing this out, except that so many participants in the
debate over the factory system seem to forget it. Organizational structures and
technologies emerge in a process of experimentation and are retained or rejected to
the extent that they fit well with the environment (which needn’t be the market, in
any of its senses, alone). At the same time, those structures alter the environment,
which in turn affects what comes after. Moreover, technology does not determine
organization any more than the reverse; the two “coevolve,” which is to say no more
than that they are really both parts of the same process, both “institutions” at the
fundamental level of systems of rules and repertoires of routines.
Are these structures optimal? Only in the limited sense that, as Stephen Jay
Gould puts it in the biological context, they must work well enough: they must
satisfy an “engineer’s criterion of good design” (Gould 1977, p. 42). And, as Hayek
(1967) points out, evolved social structures, as the product of often extended periods
of trial-and-error learning, are repositories of knowledge more substantial than, and
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often different in character from, the knowledge of those who appraise those
structures with an eye to redesigning them. But none of this implies optimality in
the global or absolute sense to which neoclassical welfare economics often pretends.
The effectiveness of a structure’s design is measured only relative to the
environment, not against an absolute standard.

Many different alternative

structures might have solved the problem of the environment equally well, either
because the selection mechanism was not particularly severe or simply because
there are many different engineering solutions that are equally good. Moreover, the
sequence of environments through which the structure has passed may be
important (Hayek 1967, p. 75), and historical accidents or crucial individuals may
shunt evolution along a path that may or may not seem best in retrospect (David
1985).
Lying as it does between the poles of necessity and arbitrariness,
evolutionary explanation can be, and of course has been, tugged in one direction or
another. Lately, indeed, the problem of path dependency has been wielded by
many as a kind of all-purpose weapon of attack against various evolved institutional
structures.

It is important to remember, however, that even a path-dependent

institutional structure is still an evolved structure, one carrying a heavy burden of
accumulated social learning. It is perhaps an open question whether the QWERTY
keyboard layout, for example, is optimal from a human-engineering standpoint
(Liebowitz and Margolis 1990); but it remains a formidable and functional
institution structure comprising an enormous body of complementary technology
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and skills within society. In the end, the evolutionary mode of explanation does not
so much endorse Pangloss as shift the burden of argument away from those who
would defend the status quo and onto those who would attack or redesign it.
Of the combatants in the debate over the emergence of the factory system, it
is probably the economic historians who have best understood this mode of
explanation, at least instinctively. By combining sequence with at least a modicum
of theory, economic history forces one to confront both the processes of institutional
evolution and the “engineering design” arguments we might use to make sense of
that evolution. Perhaps it is for that reason that the historians’ account of the
transition makes the most sense — in theory as well as in history.
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